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'' 
S'f A'l'E:MENT BY SENL1'0R $ TROM THUilMOND ON FOREIGN _AID B!L~., ·H. R. 12181, 
ON SENATE FLOOR, JUNlt 1fF 1958•. 
MR. PRESIDENT: 
1 
Last January 9, ttte President of the United States appeared 
before the Congress and delivered his State of the Union message. In 
the course of that address, he made this statement: 
"The threat to our safety, and to the hope of a peaceful
world, can be simply stated. It is Communist imperialism." 
This is a clear statement. I believe I am safe in saying / that 
every member of this body recognizes it as a true statement. The 
great threat to world security today/ is contained in the expansionist 
~mbitions of the Communist empire, as directed from its headquarters 
in the Kremlin. Yet, even though we all recognize this to be true, we 
~re considering a measure today/'that will have the effect of giving 
~inancial aid to the Communist empire. 
The bill, in its present form, makes a distinction between the 
head and trunk of the Communist empire~ nd its arms and legs. It 
~dopts the philosophy that we can, by giving aid to the limbs, 
~ncourage them to detach themselves from the bodyo It is based on the 
~ash assumption~hat the Communist imperialists will permit the limbs 
~o amputate themselves/ whenever they desire to do so. 
I submit that we cannot nourish a part of the Communist animal / 
without nourishing all of it. I contend that aid to a Commun~st 
nation;{s aid to Communism. It is as simple as that. 
I will quote now from a section of the Report of the Committee on 
Forei n Relat!£..us, in which the Committee presents its rationalization 
of this program/to amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 
1951/and authorize assistance to all Communist nations with the 
excepti.ons o:f the Soviet UnJon,. Communist China and North Korea. 
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I quv te nov1 1'?"6m 't::i~ F,epo!'t: 
, "A number of importanu · develbpmehts within the Communist bloc /
have taken place since 19~i, CommUhist China has become a signiiic~nt
power./with:i.n the Communist;: m.ovement. The apparent monolithic 
solidarity of the ~atellite countries/ has proved in some cases to be 
syntheticc A series of crackft has appeared in the Iron Curtaino 
There ip cohclusive evidence/ that the subject peoples in Eastern 
~urope/ have never fully accepted communism~~o 
. "Thus it is now apparent/t)lat., in addition to nations dominated 
9ompletel7 by the Soviet Union/ and nations free cf such dominati.on., 
~here is a third category of na·:.;ions in the process of moving away
.(rom Communist control/ and establishing some measure of independence:. •• 
~ome ha·ve already achieved an important measure of independepce., and 
iome have obtained a full measure of political independence/ but 
continue to be economically dependent upon the Soviet Union or 
Qommunis·t China." 
As a justification of a program for aiding Communist nations., 
I 
t~is rationalization fails to satisfy me., in several important 
~espects: 
First, and perhaps most importantly, it makes the error of 
confusing the ambitions for freedom held b}r 'the people of the 
satellite nations/with the ambitions of the governments of those 
countries. The great masses of people, I agree., would like to strike 
o:ff the shackles of Communism, If we could find a way to effectively 
a.id these people:i in a direct fashion, we might be able., in this way, 
tp make a contribution to the peace of the world. The plain and 
simple fact of the matter, however, is that aid t~ Communist state3/ 
must be administered in close cooperation /with the Communist 
governments of those states. Is it reasonable to suppose that these 
Communist governments/will collaborate in a program designed to bring 
about their dissolution? I think~. Communists are not deficient 
in the instinct for self-preservation. No matter whence the source, 
Communist gove.nunout.s wj l l Ul'f~ t.he as~i.stance given them Ao strengtb€D 
thsir ::·egimes .. 
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Second, there is no evidence to indicate that masters of the 
Communist empire/ are willing to permit the disintegration of their 
domaino I need only mention the Hungarian revolt of 1956/ to 
illustrate the point / that the Soviet Union will deal ruthlessly and 
implacably/ with a member of the empire that attempts to pull away. 
It is true that we have had an increasing amount of political 
independence /in the so-called satellite states. It appears, however, 
that this political independence~ s limited to the amount that the 
Kremlin feels to be desirable/ for administrative purposes. 
Third, we must recognize the existence of well established trade 
channels/t,etween the individual States of the Communist empire, 
particularly between the satellites and the Soviet Union. Following 
World War II, the Soviet Union dismantled many industrial plants in 
the areas it had occupied/ and moved equipment and finished goods back 
to Russia/ to replace Soviet installations and inventories which had 
been destroyed during the war. The principle was well established / 
that critical shortages in the Soviet Union /could be filled by imports 
from the satellite states. If we commit ourselves to a program of 
aiding Communist states, we must expect that some of this assistance 
will be used, · in undercover fashion, to bolster the economy of the 
Soviet Union, or, of Communist Chinao 
The fourth point I wish to make/is a corollary of the third. To 
the extent that the Soviet Union may be required, in the pursuit of 
its own interests, to provide supplies to satellite nations for the 
relief of famine, disaster or other emergency, any American program 
which undertakes to provide the same supplies is a program for the 
relief of the S?viet Union. As men of good will, we have a natural 
humanitarian desire to alleviate suffering, wherever it may occur/ and 
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wi. i:.~11..,;ut rcfe j_·e u c0 tu geopolitical considerat i ons. However, when we 
attempt to come to the rescue of Communist governments, and invite 
them to use our resources to alleviate hardships within their bo~ders, 
we are merely taking unto ourselves a burden /which would normally fall 
on the Soviet Union/or another member of the Communist empiree 
Fifth, the program of aid to Communist countries / which may appear 
~o be on the verge of defecting from the Communist empire/ is based 
on a misguided concept of strategy. Our mutual security program is 
designed as an obstacle to Communist expansion. Therefore, some have 
reasoned, the greatest effort in foreign aid should be made in those 
~ountries /where the threat of Communism is the greatest. This line 
of reasoning / leads to the concept of aid to Communist countries. The 
Hon. Chester Bowles, formerly our ambassador to India, stated the 
fallacy of this reasoning succinctly/'when he pointed out/ that we have 
"appeared to offer a premium to those countries which have the most 
Communistso" 
"A nation that could produce a sufficiently frightening array 
df local Communist agitators," Mr. Bowles observed, "was often 
flooded with more assistance than it could properly use, while other 
nations/'which were less well endowed with such troublemakers / received 
little or nothing." 
In view of this state of affairs, we should not be surprised when 
countr ies in Asia, Africa and Latin America /develop Communist 
movements. I do not believe that such movements develop / as a 
deliberate, calculated step in obtaining liberal American aid, but it 
must be obvious to every foreign political leader/ that a judicious 
amount of Communism in the body politic / is an important requisite for 
obtaining assistance from the United States. 
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Sixth~ aid to Communist nations h.s aid to countries which might 
well be fighting against us~ n the event of war. Every member of this 
body is well aware of the difficulty/ or drawing the line between 
military aid and economic aid. In modern warfare, every step that is 
taken to make a nation self-sufficient in the economic sense / is a step 
which improves · that country 9s mobilization base/'and makes it better 
able to wage waro A step to improve the war-making potential of a 
Communist stateA.s like playing with- dynamite. 
Mr. President, in the 10 years since Congress first embarked on 
a foreign aid program /through its approval of the Marshall Plan, we 
have seen many changes in the concept and form of the program. 
We originally contemplated a comparatively modest plan /for the 
restoration of Western Europeo The Marshall Plan worked well. It 
gave some Americans / the confidence to launch into a global program / 
with multiple objectives. The global program has not worked well. 
Military assistance, which most directly strengthens our defenses/' 
by building up the armed strength of our allies/ has been sadly 
mismanaged, and at times it is even given to nations/ that are not true 
friends of this country. 
I quote from House Report No. 1281 of the House Government 
Operations Committee: 
"The conclusions of the Comptroller General mean/that the United 
States has given mili~ary end items to some countries/ to equip a total 
force which is either/ beyond (1) the manpower capabilities of the 
country to raise, (2) the technical capability1 to maintain, (3) the economic capability of the country to sustain1even if such a force 
could be raised, or (4) the desire or willingness of the recipient 
country 7to fulfill or/ comply with the military objectives assigned to 
it. It means furth1r that the maximum military effectiveness of the 
countries involved / could have been developed with less United States 
aid / than thp.t which has been furnished, or which will be furnished in 
the future / so long as such an unrealistic basis is used for 
programming military assistanceo" 
-5-
This House report was baeed 1argely oh th~ findings bf tHe 
~onorabla Joseph Campbell, th~_Comptroller G~hera1, who deserves the 
/ I , 
~hanks of evsry citizeh /f6r hts able Work as the watbhdog of the 
'l'reasury .. 
Mr. Campbell made a number of disclosures, among them the fact / 
that there has never been an internal audit of the military aid 
' 
Rrogram, and that no estimates have ever been developed as to the 
! 
tong-range cost of the program. 
Indiscriminate economic assistance has failed to contribute to 
the security of the United States/in proportion to its cost to the 
American taxpayer. 
We have assumed that economic development/can pave the way for 
the growth of democracies/patterned after our own in the undeveloped 
areas of the world. However, this program of force-feeding industry 
and agriculture, through heavy governmental expenditures, is basically 
opposed to the American system of free enterprise. It is more closely 
a~in to the principles of state socialism. In the cases where our 
e.conomic aid /results in a sudden increase in the wealth and 
ptoductivity of a nation -- and these cases are rare -- we are likely 
to find that the government which develops/is a government which 
relies heavily on continued governmental control of production. 
Dictatorship is a more likely product than democracy. 
We have made the mistake of trying to buy friends. You cannot 
just go out and buy love of representative democracy/and love of 
freedom~ike you can buy a ton of coal/or a bushel of wheat. Love and 
friendship must first exist,An the hearts of the people themselves, 
and if it does not exist there, no number of our dollars will put it 
there~ 
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Who is to say that we did not have just as many, if not more, 
friends/ at the end of World War II/than we have right now? Who is to 
say/ that, instead of curing the ills of the world with our dollars, we 
have not added to them -- by aiding communism in many instances, by 
subsidizing socialism in even more instances, by destroying the 
independence and self-reliance of many nations, by upsetting the way 
of life of peoples when they do not want it upset? 
A striking example can be pointed out/ by reference to a quotation 
from a Ceylon newspaper which said: 
If the United States withdrew its offer of aid, that 
would be the price Ceylon would cheerfully pay to maintain 
her independenceo•• If any country in the world offers 
Ceylon aid without strings / she will gladly and gratefully 
accept as Nehru 9 s India has done, but she cannot be bought,
sold or bartered. After all, we have survived without 
American aid all these years/and our self respect cannot 
be bought with dollars. 
More and more/we find that nations are responding to American aid 
as the Ceylon newspaper does, namely, that when a country accepts 
foreign aid from the United States, it feels that it is doing this 
country a favor. If some of the countries receiving American aid are 
so blinded with pride/that they don't know the difference between 
Communist oppression and American generosity, then the time has come 
to stop injuring their pride/with gifts of American dollars. 
In addition to making the mistake of trying to buy friends, we 
have also made ourselves appear to be rich and arrogant, in our 
relations with the poorer nations of the world. The recent riots in 
Formosa~hould be evidence enough of the envious feeling we have 
generated/among the countries with small resources~ 
Through the foreign aid program/ we have imposed a heavy burden / 
on the taxpayers of today and the taxpayers of tomorrow, for this 
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burden will persist for generations to comeo Recently the Congress 
voted to raise the debt limit to $280 billion. By the end of this 
fiscal year /we will have authorized or spent approximately one-fourth 
of our national debt, into this and other "give-away" programs11 The 
interest alone on the foreign aid portion of the national debt / is 
costing us between two and three billion dollars annually. At the 
same time, some of this assistance has been used by foreign countries / 
to reduce their own taxes and pay off their own national debts. 
I am alarmed at this programo. It is wrong in its conception, and 
it has been bungled in its executiono In the past 10 years many 
mistakes have been made and many instances of wastefulness, 
extravagance, graft and inefficiency have been brought to light. 
would like to recall for a few moments several of these projects to 
illustrate some of the follies of our foreign aid program. 
Our foreign aiders have poured millions of dollars into overseas 
reclamation projects which will make it possible for foreign countries 
to reclaim thousands of acres of farmland to compete with our own 
farmers here at home who have been in an agricultural recession for 
the past several years. 
They have also helped set up textile and other industries in 
foreign countries where low-wage competition can have further adverse 
effects on domestic employment. Of the foreign aid money used by 
recipient countries to purchase textile products in 1957, only 7.5 per 
cent was purchased from United States mills. The rest, amounting to 
$89 million, was bought from Japan and other competitors. 
Our country, which plants very little rice, has sent technicians 
to Korea to teach Korean rice growers how to grow more and better rice. 
At the same time, shrewd Korean and Vietnam merchants have made large 
windfall profits and have maneuvered kickbacks while trading in 
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I 
foreign aid itemso 
The House Government Operations report says that a quarter of a 
billion dollars in assistance to Iran from 1951-56 was administered in 
a it loose, slipshod, and unbusinesslike manner," adding that amounts 
requested for aid to Iran "seem to have been picked out of the airo" 
In Laos, where we have been spending more money per capita than 
in any other country, the Communist Party is gaining more and more 
political power. In addition, the country's Minister of Planning and 
Reconstruction, who is the leader of the Communist political movement, 
has a voice in the spending of some of this American aid. 
In Saudi Arabia, we have been giving millions to billionaire King 
Saud who has more than a hundred wives and gold-plated Cadillacs. 
If all this were not enough, this program has also provided wage 
boosts to Iranian government workers, public baths for Egyptian camel 
drivers, airplane rides for thousands of Moslems to visit their 
religious shrine in Mecca, a sugar beet refinery where there were 
insufficient beets, and we have even given some countries so much that 
we have contributed to their inflationary spirals. 
If I had to single out one error as the most dangerous of all, I 
would fine the choice a difficult one. There are too many from which 
to choose. 
As of this moment, I am inclined to rank the mistake of offering 
aid to Communist countries above all the rest. I see no justification 
whatever for a program to combat Communism by extending aid to 
Communism. I think it is important, therefore, that we eliminate from 
H.R. 12181 any provision which would authorize any assistance to 
Communist countries. 
The Senate is being asked _this week to authorize under the 
provisions of this bill $3,068,900,000. This is ~229 million less 
than the $3,297,900,000 requested by the Administration. These 
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figures show that the Administration/is committed to continue this 
foreign aid program/ at a high level of spending. 
Certainly, with a national debt of $280 billion, with a possible 
deficit of $9 billion facing us during fiscal year 1959, with greater 
expenditures required for missile and satellite development and 
research, with other economic and social needs staring us in the face 
at home, and with our people paying almost one-third of their income 
in taxes~ the time has now come / for the United States to take steps 
toward shackling this foreign aid monster/ and bringing its spending 
spree to an end, No one can argue with the principle / that the best 
assurance we have for the preservation of freedom in this world / is the 
maintenance of a strong America, and if this strength is to be 
sustained and maintained, then we must reduce our foreign aid program / 
lest we spend ourselves to death and ruin our country economically/ in 
accordance with the prophesies and hopes of Marx and Lenin. 
Furthermore, if given the chance, private investment could 
replace foreign aid in many nations. 
Some feel that the greatest hindrance to foreign investment /is 
fear of confiscationo I do not agree. I think the greatest hindrance / 
is foreign aid. Private capital does not go to a country/ whose 
economy is choked with sterile capital that yields no profit. 
The largest receiver of federal handouts since World War rr / has 
been Western Europe, and it has been the smallest receiver/ or new............ 
investment funds from private sources. As of 1956, Western Europe 
had received close to 70 per cent of the money / spent under the foreign 
aid program. But the ratio of private investment in that area by the 
United States/ runs only about 14 per cent. On the other hand, Latin 




1956, but it received 35 per cent of our foreign private investment. 
Only an invisible amount of aid went to Canada, but 34 per cent of our 
foreign investment has gone there. 
If investment capital is to be stimulated, foreign aid must be 
cut offo Private investment has been encouraged everywhere/through 
the faith that we may have a lasting peace. 
The change-over from the charity dollar to the investment dollar/ 
would have a stimulatin~ effect, and it would inspire the nations we 
have been trying to help/ with confidence and new hope. In addition, 
it would demonstrate to the world/the virtues of our free enterprise 
system. 
Aside from these points, however, it would release thousands of 
foreign aiders and bureaucrats, which, in itself, would be a worth­
while accomplishment/toward reducing the size of our Federal 
·government. 
In summary of my comments on foreign aid, let me say that I favor 
a reduction in the size of this program now, not tomorrow, next year, 
or in 1960 -- but nowp 
America should continue to help faithful and loyal allies in 
Europe and Asia/with a program of reasonable military assistanceh.n 
order to keep American boys at home and strengthen the free world. 
As to economic aid -- or whatever modern term it has been given in 
recent years / in order to deceive the public -- I believe that if we 
are going to give such assistancel'it should be on a loan basis/so that 
the recipients will know and feel their obligation /and so that we can 
stand some chance of recovering some of these funds. 
In accordance with the views set forth in this speech, Mr. 
President, I shall vote to reduce the authorization recommendations 
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of the committee. If the bill is not properly amended, then it is my 
intention to vote against final passage of the bill/ as I have done in 
previous years. 
-END-
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